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INTRODUCTION 
Legal evolution evidences that trademarks are currently protected 
not only to avoid consumer confusion, but also to provide firms with an 
adequate return on investments made to create and maintain strong 
brands.  However, the rational basis of this development is subject to 
question and review.  While free riding on a famous brand may, indeed, 
generate negative spillover effects, such as trademark dilution, and this 
may, in turn, reduce the incentive to invest in trademarks, this Article 
seeks to illustrate that such investment cannot be seen as indicative of 
product quality.  Indeed, this Article suggests that the existence of 
trademark protection does not, per se, create an incentive for 
continuous improvement in product quality.  Not even the signalling 
argument—specifically, in relation to advertising and brand 
extensions—can, by itself, justify the extended protection of strong 
trademarks.  In fact, the signalling argument may be invoked only when 
negative spillover effects are proven and are shown to adversely affect 
both the senior user of the trademark and the profitability of the 
trademark in all markets, thereby leading to a reduction of “welfare.” 
Part I of this Article begins by outlining the function of trademarks 
from a traditional law and economics perspective.  The current 
evolution of trademark protection and the “new” lawyers’ 
interpretation of trademark functions is addressed in Part II, including a 
discussion of the apparent conflict between this approach and the 
traditional view of economists.  Part III summarizes the standard 
economic doctrine regarding trademark protection and argues that this 
doctrine does not completely address new questions raised, for example, 
by the existence of “strong” brands and their extensions.  Accordingly, 
Parts IV and V briefly review the economic literature regarding 
advertising, brand extensions, and product quality.  Ultimately, as 
outlined in Part VI, an extended protection of strong trademarks cannot 
be clearly explained by the desire to protect high product quality.  
However, assuming the possibility of trademark dilution caused by free 
riding on strong trademarks, it is evident that an extended protection 
can prevent welfare losses when product variety is considered as an 
important argument of the consumers’ utility function.  The Appendix 
at the conclusion of this Article includes additional analysis to illustrate 
that when free riding leads to an increase in the product classes covered 
by a famous trademark, then the senior user has an incentive to free ride 
on his or her trademark. 
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I.  THE FUNCTION OF TRADEMARKS:  A TRADITIONAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS APPROACH 
In the standard literature of law and economics, trademark law is 
presented as an incentive for business enterprises to invest in the quality 
of the goods and services with which marks are used and as a remedy to 
specific market failures.1  Thus, it is argued that if it were impossible for 
consumers and for the public-at-large to identify the source of goods, 
then every business would have an incentive to supply goods at a quality 
lower than the average prevailing in the industry because the profits 
generated by the individual transaction would, in fact, be garnered by 
the individual business entering into it, while the reputational costs 
derived from the public’s disappointment with the quality of goods 
would be externalized to the entire industry.2  Accordingly, the adoption 
of a sign or symbol that consistently links the goods to a source over 
time is seen as a device to overcome this difficulty.3 
In a similar vein, it is often noted that while the presence of a 
trademark lowers the search costs born by consumers, it also enables the 
public to repeat purchases that have proven satisfactory and to avoid 
future purchases of goods that have previously failed to do so.4  Firms 
that offer a satisfactory price-quality combination are, thus, rewarded; in 
contrast, the ones that fail to do so must suffer the consequences.5 
From this perspective, the case is often made that while other 
intellectual property rights—for example, patents and copyrights—
provide a mix of static costs and dynamic benefits, in principle, very few 
costs and no deadweight losses whatsoever are associated with 
trademark protection.6  This holds true, of course, provided that a few 
simple legal caveats are put in place.7 
 
 1. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167–68 (2003). 
 2. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266–68 (1987). 
 3. Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 601, 601–03 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. 
ECON. 488, 499–500 (1970). 
 4. See, e.g., Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. 
L. REV. 813, 818 (1927) (noting that the “true functions of the trademark are, then, to identify 
a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming 
public”). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 266–68. 
 7. As the authors indicate, while other intellectual property rights have a public good 
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Indeed, the legal system adopts the following:  (1) rules against 
appropriating generic names as trademarks in order to avoid the 
monopolization of current language on behalf of one business to the 
detriment of others,8 and (2) rules against the adoption of functional or 
aesthetic features as trademarks9 in order to avoid that the same are 
appropriated by one specific firm to the exclusion of its competitors.  
Thus, it follows that trademark protection may well be perpetual—in 
other words, it may be for a limited time (usually ten years)10 but subject 
to renewal at the holder’s option11—considering that in a well-tuned 
legal system incorporating the rules under (1) and (2) above,12 such 
protection does not affect the competitive structure of the market and is 
not likely to entail any deadweight loss. 
It should be noted that until just a few decades ago, both common 
and civil law lawyers adopted an approach to explain the rationale for 
trademark protection that was markedly different from the one 
suggested by economists, but was altogether compatible with it.  
According to the standard lawyers’ original understanding, the rationale 
for trademark protection resides in the trademark’s function of 
designating the origin of the goods:  the public should be protected 
against the risk of confusion as to the origin of the goods deriving from 
the unauthorized use of an identical or similar sign in connection with 
identical or similar goods.  At this stage, lawyers tended, however, to 
add that this system did create an incentive to encourage firms to invest 
in the quality of the goods offered to the market; this, thereby, 
established a clear link to the economists’ approach summarized 
above.13  However, lawyers were reluctant to assert that the main 
purpose of trademark law is to guarantee the qualitative level of the 
goods on which the mark is affixed; they were afraid that this 
understanding might ultimately fetter the freedom of trademark holders 
to vary the characteristics of the goods.  But they were ready to join 
their economist brethren in recognizing that the de facto outcome of the 
operation of trademark law is to keep the qualitative level of the goods 
on which the mark is affixed constant over time.  Still, according to this 
 
character such that restricting their use has a cost, “a proper trademark is not a public good; it 
has social value only when used to designate a single brand.”  Id. at 274. 
 8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2000). 
 9. See, e.g., id. 
 10. See, e.g., id. § 1058. 
 11. See, e.g., id. 
 12. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 13. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
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early approach, protection against infringement could only be granted 
on the basis of a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the origin of the 
goods.14 
II.  THE LEGAL EVOLUTION AND THE NEW PROTECTED FUNCTION OF 
TRADEMARKS 
In the last sixty years, trademark laws have evolved considerably.15  
Since 1947, twenty-five state legislatures in the United States have 
granted trademark protection even in the absence of any likelihood of 
confusion as to the origin of the goods and services.16  The work of 
Frank Schechter is generally considered to have provided the seminal 
contribution to the “trademark dilution” doctrine that was largely 
responsible for underpinning this legislative development.17 According 
to the doctrine of trademark dilution, famous trademarks should be 
granted protection even in the absence of direct competition between 
the senior and the junior users and in the absence of a risk of confusion 
as to the origin of the marked goods.18  Although Schechter did not 
explicitly refer to the term “dilution,” he insisted that the “uniqueness 
of a mark” is the only rational basis of trademark protection.19  In fact, 
even prior to Schechter’s contribution, a few courts in the United 
States20 and Germany21 had already granted protection to famous 
trademarks in the absence of a risk of confusion as to the origin of the 
marked goods. 
 
 14. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman:  The Public Interest in the Advertising 
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1999).  Under the traditional approach, trademarks were 
considered “mere repositories of the goodwill that accumulated around the products that 
they distinguished.”  Id.  Without the product the trademark served to differentiate, the 
trademark was considered to be completely valueless.  Id. 
 15. For an illustrative overview of this evolution, see TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK 
DILUTION (1996). 
 16. Id. at 1; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995) (highlighting that as of 1995—in 
the time leading up to the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act—only 
approximately twenty-five states had legislatively enacted prohibitions against trademark 
dilution). 
 17. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 813. 
 18. Id. at 825–30. 
 19. Id. at 823, 831. 
 20. See, e.g., Wall v. Rolls-Royce of Am., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925) (considering use of 
the ROLLS-ROYCE mark on radio tubes and recognizing that the mark would suffer as a 
result of this association). 
 21. See, e.g., Landesgericht Elberfeld [LG] [District Court] Sept. 11, 1925, 25 Juristische 
Wochenschrift 502, XXV Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 264 (deciding a case regarding the 
use of the well-known ODOL mark for mouthwash and recognizing the importance of not 
permitting the value of the mark to be diminished by another’s use of the mark). 
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In the last several decades, the trickle has become a flood.  Since 
1970, antidilution protection has been adopted by the Benelux 
countries,22 and the 1988 Directive of the Council of the European 
Communities has been adopted by all Member States.23  In this latter 
case, the antidilution feature was complemented by a prohibition 
against any form of free riding on the reputation of a senior mark.24  
Protection against both dilution and free riding is also granted by 
Council Regulation 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark.25  In both 
provisions, free riding is considered a prohibited way of taking “unfair 
advantage of . . . the distinctive character or the repute” of the senior 
mark.26  In 1994, antidilution prohibitions were, to some extent, 
generalized by the provisions of the international agreement binding all 
of the 147 Member States to the World Trade Organization (WTO) via 
Article 16 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement).27  In particular, Article 16(3) 
states the following: 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to goods or services which are not similar to those in 
respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that use of 
that trademark in relation to those goods or services would 
indicate a connection between those goods or services and the 
owner of the registered trademark and provided that the 
 
 22. See Benelux Convention on Trade Marks, Mar. 19, 1962, 704 U.N.T.S. 341, 351–52. 
 23. See Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1. 
 24. As a matter of fact, Directive 89/104 left open the option for Member States to 
decide whether to implement protection against dilution or not.  Indeed, Article 5(2) states 
the following: 
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent 
all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign 
which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services 
which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the 
latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due 
cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the 
repute of the trade mark. 
Id. art. 5(2).  Unsurprisingly, all Member States have taken advantage of the Directive’s 
permissiveness in this regard. 
 25. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 9(1)(c), 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1. 
 26. Id.; Council Directive 89/104, supra note 23, art. 5(2). 
 27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
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interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be 
damaged by such use.28 
Finally, an antidilution rule was also adopted at the federal level in the 
United States:  the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).29  A 
decade later, the changes made to the trademark laws with the FTDA 
were fine-tuned with the adoption of the Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act (TDRA).30 
The rationale behind the extension of protection to include 
principles of antidilution and prohibitions against free riding has been 
clear to both courts and commentators from the very beginning.  When 
a trademark may be perceived as “strong” because it possesses a 
distinctive character or is “famous,” then its value is endangered by 
unauthorized uses by a non-related third party; this is true even though 
consumers may not be misled.  Rather than aim merely to protect 
against confusion as to the origin of goods, these extended protections 
are intended to avoid dilution of the promotional value of trademarks31 
 
 28. Id. art. 16(3).  This provision is much less “protectionist” than the rules contained in 
European legislation resulting from the implementation of Directive 89/104.  Indeed, 
European law grants protection even in the absence of any actual damage for the senior 
mark.  See generally GUSTAVO GHIDINI, PROFILI EVOLUTIVI DEL DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 
(2001).  It is, in fact, sufficient for the junior mark to take advantage of the reputation of the 
senior mark to fall under the provision and to be considered an infringer.  It can similarly be 
observed that the legislation of Member States, as opposed to Article 16(3) of the TRIPs 
Agreement, grants a wider protection to well-known marks because it does not require “that 
use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark.”  TRIPs 
Agreement, supra note 27, art. 16(3).  Therefore, it can be argued that Article 16(3) of the 
TRIPs Agreement sticks to the traditional approach by requesting a form of likelihood of 
confusion, which has been expanded to a risk for the consumer to establish a “connection” 
between the two producers, as a condition for granting protection to the senior mark, 
whereas the legislation of Member States dispenses with this requirement.  See id.  However, 
according to the interpretation of the legislation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a 
finding of infringement requires, at a minimum, that the degree of similarity between the 
mark with a reputation and the junior sign has the effect that the relevant section of the 
public establishes a “link” between the junior sign and the senior mark.  See Case C-408/01, 
Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537.  For further analysis 
of Article 16(3) of the TRIPs Agreement and Article 5(2) of Council Directive 89/104, see 
GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 191–280 (2d ed. 2002). 
 29. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000)). 
 30. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see Barton Beebe, A Defense of the 
New Federal Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1144, 1151–
56 (2006). 
 31. According to the U.S. approach, this can occur by “tarnishment” of the positive 
associations engendered by a trademark as well as by “blurring” its distinctiveness.  Thus, for 
example, “Buttwiser” t-shirts have been considered as tarnishing the BUDWEISER mark for 
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and the misappropriation of the capital of publicity invested in 
trademarks. 
As a result, protections are now afforded to trademarks where they 
formerly might not have been.  The trademark ROLLS-ROYCE can 
now be protected, for example, in most jurisdictions against its use as a 
sign for a pub even if no consumer would be misled into believing that 
the trademark owner had branched off into pub franchises or that there 
is an association with or sponsorship of the pub by the luxury car 
manufacturer.  For a finding of infringement, confusion as to the origin 
of goods is no longer required.32  It is sufficient that consumers establish 
some sort of link between the junior sign and the senior one, and such a 
link may be established even if the goods are comparatively remote.33 
Therefore, it is recognized that the traditional function of 
designating the origin of the goods is not the function that gets 
protected through antidilution laws.  Instead, protection is afforded to 
the investment that the right holder has made in promotion—this is a 
value that has been stored in the sign or symbol.34  Affording measures 
to protect investment in marks recognizes that “marks are cyphers 
around which investment in the promotion of a product is built and that 
investment is a value which deserves protection as such, even when 
there is no abuse arising from misrepresentations either about origin or 
quality.”35  It could be argued, at least in principle, that the greater the 
investment in advertising, the wider the protection that should be 
granted by law. 
As indicated, lawyers did not fail to elaborate quite early on the 
underlying reason for such an extension of protection.36  In fact, what 
they have been saying—particularly in the last two decades, but in some 
instances much earlier37—is that trademarks not only serve as indicators 
of origin, as was initially held under older trademark law regimes, but 
they also serve both as devices for storing investment in promotion and 
as proxies for quality levels.  Most legal systems have now evolved to 
 
beer.  See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996).  For a treatment of the issue of dilution by “blurring,” see Mead Data Cent., Inc. 
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 33. See id. 
 34. W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE 
MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 612 (4th ed. 1999). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See supra Part I. 
 37. See, e.g., Schechter, supra note 4, at 813; see also Von Hermann Isay, Die 
Selbständigkeit des Rechts an der Marke, 1929 GRUR 23. 
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ensure that protections extend to all of these functions.38  Lawyers note 
that this development makes sense.  After all, more and more consumer 
decisions are made as a result of the direct communication between 
firms and the public through advertising, rather than as a repetition of a 
prior successful purchasing experience. 
For its part, economic literature specifically concerned with 
intellectual property protection has not undergone a corresponding 
evolution and still provides a rationale for trademark protection that fits 
the old legal regime rather than the new one.  When it comes to 
explaining the rules against dilution and free riding, the explanations are 
either unsatisfactory or outright puzzling.  William M. Landes and 
Richard A. Posner purport to explain trademark antidilution rules by 
underlining that even association without confusion may be damaging.39  
They believe that this principle is adequately demonstrated by the fact 
that few children have been named “Adolf” in the time since Hitler’s 
evilness was exposed.40  At the same time, they deny that the purpose of 
this feature may consist in internalizing the benefits of investment in a 
prestigious brand.41  Even the pioneering contribution of “perception 
advertising,” which was set forth by Nicholas Economides and defined 
as the bundling of a mental image and a physical commodity through a 
trademark,42 is coupled with only the most cursory account of 
antidilution rules.43  On the other hand, a substantial number of 
economists have discussed in great detail and with remarkable insights 
both brand stretching and the rationale for the extension of brand 
protection; however, their insights are primarily concerned with the 
economics of advertising and have not extended to particularly 
addressing intellectual property issues and the shift in the rationale for 
trademark protection.44 
Thus, even today trademarks still tend to be seen by mainstream law 
and economics literature as “incentives”:  they are viewed as self-
 
 38. See Litman, supra note 14, at 1721–25 (recounting the expansion of the laws of 
trademark protection). 
 39. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 207. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 206–09. 
 42. Economides, supra note 3, at 603. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See, e.g., Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, Advertising and Prices as Signals of 
Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry, 20 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 907 (2002); Richard E. 
Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 92 J. POL. ECON. 427 (1984); Paul 
Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
796 (1986); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974). 
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enforcing mechanisms that serve to ensure that consumers are provided 
with a satisfactory quality of the goods bearing the brand mark.45  Here, 
it is submitted that this view is outdated and certainly deserves a closer 
look. 
III.  TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRODUCT QUALITY 
Economists generally agree on the fact that trademark protection 
creates an incentive for the production of quality goods.46  However, this 
function is presented by economists in two different versions.  Some 
authors claim that trademark protection induces firms to offer goods 
with a precisely defined and constant quality.47  For others, trademark 
protection makes firms produce high quality goods, and the aggregate 
effect is to increase the average quality of goods throughout the whole 
market.48 
The adoption of the latter approach may be crucial to providing a 
rationale for the extended protection of “strong” and famous 
trademarks.  Take, for instance, the primary finding of Landes and 
Posner:  the higher the quality of products, the greater the incentive to 
invest in order to create a “strong” trademark.49  Although Landes and 
Posner put forth a seminal contribution in the economic literature on 
trademarks, their findings are affected by several limitations as related 
to the aims of our research.  First, Landes and Posner tacitly assume 
that the activities that create a “strong” trademark, such as the 
production of high quality products and advertising, are perfect signals 
to consumers regarding the characteristics of products.50  Second, their 
model mainly concerns firms that are attempting to build a “strong” 
trademark;51 what really is at stake in real markets, though, is the 
extended protection of brands that are already “strong.”  And third, 
their model deals with the use of trademarks within a product class; the 
possibility of non-homogeneous goods is included, but the phenomenon 
 
 45. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 270. 
 46. Id. at 269 (“[T]rademark protection encourages expenditures on quality.”). 
 47. Economides, supra note 3, at 602; see also Akerlof, supra note 3, at 499–500. 
 48. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Landes & Posner, supra note 2; Carl 
Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 
(1982). 
 49. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 269–70. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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of brand extension is not considered.52  This same limitation 
characterizes the work of others as well.53 
The first issue will be discussed in Part IV,54 while the second and 
third issues will be addressed in Part V.55  Here, however, we intend to 
clarify the general relationship between the legal protection of private 
trademarks and product quality. 
Trademark protection does, indeed, supply an incentive for firms to 
maintain a constant product quality, but it does not necessarily create 
incentives to offer high quality products.  The latter depends on the 
general strategies of product differentiation, which are, in turn, linked to 
market structure, the type of goods and services, and the nature of 
competition prevailing in the market with respect to price, quantity, 
variety, and quality.  This point may be illustrated by means of a well-
known example:  the principle of (maximum) product differentiation.56  
The principle of product differentiation represents one of the most 
important theoretical contributions provided by the literature on 
industrial organization.57 
Jean Tirole outlines the principle of product differentiation by 
presenting an illustration wherein there are two firms:58  consider a 
market where two profit-maximizing firms simultaneously compete by 
choosing the quality and then the price of a product.  Thus, the “game” 
is in two stages and firms have perfect information about the 
characteristics of the market.59  It can be shown that, in equilibrium, one 
firm offers a product with the highest available quality while the other 
chooses the lowest quality level, given constant costs of quality.  The 
prices will differ substantially as well.  The economic intuition for this 
equilibrium is that firms maximally differentiate product quality in 
order to “relax” price competition, which would drive profits down if 
the two products were similar.60  High product differentiation, thus, 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 
211 (1986); J.A.K. Huntley & Frank H. Stephen, Unfair Competition, Consumer Deception, 
and Brand Copying:  An Economic Perspective, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 443 (1995); W.J. 
Lane, Compulsory Trademark Licensing, 54 S. ECON. J. 643(1988). 
 54. See infra Part IV. 
 55. See infra Part V. 
 56. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 281–82, 306 (1988). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 281. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  Tirole notes that “[e]ach firm locates far from its rival in order not to trigger a 
low price from the rival, and thus price competition is softened.”  Id. 
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enables firms to identify their own market segment.61  The result of 
maximum quality differentiation is an extreme case, and its occurrence 
depends on the assumptions of the model, including such variables as 
the number of firms, the structure of the game, and costs of quality, 
among others.  Although many authors have shown that, if these are 
modified, the maximum differentiation principle does not hold, the 
basic intuition still holds:  when there is quality competition, there is not 
an upward race for the production of high quality products.62 
The strategies of product differentiation assume that consumers can 
distinguish between the various products; therefore, the model is tacitly 
based on the assumption of the existence of trademarks, as is the case in 
all oligopoly theories.63  Accordingly, the existence of trademark 
protection does not necessarily imply the production of high quality 
products.  In other words, it is difficult to claim that there exists a direct 
and positive correlation between trademark protection and high quality 
products, while there is a general consensus that trademark protection 
induces firms to maintain the quality of their goods and services 
constantly.  However, the relationship between trademark protection 
and high quality could still be indirect.  This possibility is considered 
next. 
IV.  TRADEMARK PROTECTION, PRODUCT QUALITY, AND 
ADVERTISING 
All investments devoted to achieving market success necessarily 
assume the current or future existence of a trademark, which links a 
particular product to a firm or to another umbrella brand.  This holds 
both when market success relies on research and development, and 
when it depends on advertising and promotion.64  For the sake of 
 
 61. Id.  The principle of maximum differentiation was originally obtained in a context of 
horizontal product differentiation—that is, when the strategic variable of firms is variety and 
not quality.  The debate on product differentiation strategy began in the late seventies, when 
rigorous applications of game theory permitted a reexamination of the original Hotelling 
model.  See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). 
 62. TIROLE, supra note 56, at 282. 
 63. Id. at 281–82. 
 64. In the case of industries where market success is mainly determined by research and 
development, trademark issues are partially ignored due to the importance of other forms of 
intellectual property protection, such as patents.  Trademark protection is, however, 
fundamental to market patented products.  For example, in the pharmaceutical industry the 
amount of marketing expenses is often equal to those in research and development.  In 
addition, a patent represents a leverage to create a strong brand:  during the years of patent 
protection, a product is associated with a trademark, and this association will affect consumer 
behavior even after the patent has expired. 
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simplicity, let us exclude the case of market success caused by research 
and development and consequent patent protection.  Suppose that firms 
focus on marketing and advertising investments in order to create 
particularly “strong” brands.65  This strength may be generated by brand 
loyalty or a reputation for high quality, among other things.  Therefore, 
the protection of these trademarks tacitly implies the protection of an 
adequate return on investment. 
In fact, if other firms were allowed to use “strong” trademarks—
adopting a free riding strategy—then no firms would have an interest in 
carrying out any kind of investment.  From this point of view, 
trademarks appear to be very similar to patents.  Is there a justification 
either in terms of efficiency or a guarantee of high quality of imposing 
such a particular rationale for trademark protection?  Of course, all 
trademarks should be protected against infringement even if the owner 
is small and never advertised.  But should protection be increased when 
firms carry out intense advertising campaigns?  This question is 
important empirically because trademark protection is potentially 
infinite in time, and the issue should specifically be addressed now 
because, as indicated in Part II, antidilution rules have been adopted in 
most jurisdictions in recent years.66 
The rationale for a greater protection of “strong” and famous 
trademarks may be formulated as follows.  Firms that possess “strong” 
trademarks are in this situation because of huge investments in 
advertising.67  Since intense advertising is to be expected by firms 
offering high quality products, a larger trademark protection for these 
firms is needed to ensure a high average quality, which, if everything 
else remains the same, enhances social welfare.  This argument relies, 
however, on the assumption of a positive correlation between 
advertising expenses and product quality.  There is an abundance of 
theoretical literature analyzing the relationship between advertising and 
product quality.68  The relationship is subtle, and it varies depending on 
the circumstances. 
 
 65. Hereafter, the investment aimed at maintaining a strong brand will be represented 
by advertising outlays.  Advertising is not the only promotional expense incurred by a firm to 
create and maintain strong trademarks, but it is significant given its visibility for consumers.  
The general interpretation of advertising outlays in the models that will be presented is 
expenses incurred to affect the demand. 
 66. See supra Part II. 
 67. See generally Litman, supra note 14, at 1725–28. 
 68. See, e.g., Mark W. Nichols, Advertising and Quality in the U.S. Market for 
Automobiles, 64 S. ECON. J. 922, 923–26 (1998); Richard Schmalensee, A Model of 
Advertising and Product Quality, 86 J. POL. ECON. 485 (1978). 
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Phillip Nelson’s pioneering theory explains conspicuous advertising 
outlays as a means by which producers signal the quality of their 
products to imperfectly informed consumers and suggests a positive 
correlation between quality and advertising expenditures.69  The 
explanation provided in this Article excludes markets where purchases 
are either one-shot or very infrequent with respect to changes in the 
characteristics of the products, and it focuses on experience with quality 
goods with less reliance on word-of-mouth than what Nelson classified 
as search goods.70  The main idea is that only a high quality firm would 
find it profitable to spend large sums of money on advertising.71  Indeed, 
only a high quality firm could generate enough repeat purchases to 
recover the advertising costs.72  Following Nelson, several authors have 
since developed formal models with and without repeat purchases.73 
Richard E. Kihlstrom and Michael H. Riordan consider advertising 
signals in the context of a perfectly competitive industry with free entry 
where firms are price-takers.74  They find that a positive correlation 
between advertising and quality can also arise when the interaction 
among firms and consumers is not repeated, but only if variable unit 
costs decrease with quality.75  In the analysis of Paul Milgrom and John 
Roberts, pricing and advertising combine to signal quality.76  Although a 
high price could independently serve as a signal of a correspondingly 
high quality; pricing also impacts demand.77  Despite indicating high 
quality, too high of a cost will reduce demand.78  Monopolists, therefore, 
must strike a balance in order to generate an adequate demand among 
consumers by communicating quality to consumers through pricing and 
advertising.79  The model defined by Milgrom and Roberts “relies on 
repeat purchases and therefore is better suited to explain the marketing 
strategies of non-durable experience goods rather than durable 
 
 69. Nelson, supra note 44, at 730. 
 70. See id. at 730, 735. 
 71. See id. at 735–43. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Richard Schmalensee first challenged Nelson’s views, and he developed a model in 
which advertising is, in fact, correlated with low quality due to consumers’ bounded 
rationality.  See Schmalensee, supra note 68, at 493–98. 
 74. Kihlstrom & Riordan, supra note 44, at 427. 
 75. Id. at 448–50. 
 76. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 44, at 799. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 802–14; see Laurent Linnemer, Price and Advertising as Signals of Quality 
When Some Consumers Are Informed, 20 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 931, 932 (2002). 
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experience goods.”80  Unlike, Nelson’s analysis,81 the articles by 
Kihlstrom and Riordan as well as Milgrom and Roberts82 treat 
advertising as a “purely dissipative expense.”83  Laurent Linnemer 
explains that “[t]his allows a clear separation between Nelson’s signal of 
quality argument and the other roles eventually played by advertising.”84  
Others have sought to challenge Nelson’s analysis as well.  The model 
proposed by Ignatius J. Horstmann and Glenn M. MacDonald points 
out the shortcomings of “consumption” as an indicator of product 
quality;85 these authors find fault with Nelson’s analysis to the extent 
that it presumes that consumers are fully informed regarding all relevant 
information about product quality as a result of some prior purchase.86  
Accordingly, Horstmann and MacDonald emphasize in their findings 
that the predictions of signalling models depend on considerable 
variables of consumer learning.87 
Some authors have more recently reexamined the issues regarding 
the relationship between advertising, quality, and price.88  For instance, 
according to Claude Fluet and Paolo G. Garella, price rivalry is 
essential.89  Fluet and Garella show that advertising is an essential 
element of the signalling mix in a regime of price rivalry with small 
quality differentials.90  Linnemer emphasizes that the presence of a 
proportion of informed consumers makes advertising a useful signal 
even in the absence of repeat purchases.91  Therefore, the analysis of 
 
 80. Linnemer, supra note 79, at 933. 
 81. Nelson, supra note 44, at 735–47. 
 82. See Kihlstrom & Riordan, supra note 44, at 430–46; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 
44, at 802–14. 
 83. Linnemer notes that the characterization of advertising in the two articles is as a 
“purely dissipative expense (like burning money).”  Linnemer, supra note 79, at 932. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Ignatius J. Horstmann & Glenn M. MacDonald, When Is Advertising a Signal of 
Product Quality?, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 561, 563, 565–67 (1994). 
 86. Id.; see Nelson, supra note 44, at 735–47. 
 87. Horstmann & MacDonald, supra note 85, at 565–67. 
 88. Other theoretical studies adopt a slightly different approach.  Kyle Bagwell and 
Michael H. Riordan analyze the role of high introductory prices.  Kyle Bagwell & Michael H. 
Riordan, High Declining Prices Signal Product Quality, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 224 (1991).  
Laurent Linnemer investigates the question of entry.  Laurent Linnemer, Entry Deterrence, 
Product Quality:  Price and Advertising as Signals, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 615 
(1998).  Bill Z. Yang treats a duopoly with the Cournot competition model and, therefore, 
does not consider price signals.  Bill Z. Yang, Simultaneous Advertising as a Signal of Product 
Quality, 33 AUSTL. ECON. PAPERS 186 (1994). 
 89. Fluet & Garella, supra note 44, at 908–09. 
 90. Id. at 914–21, 923. 
 91. Linnemer, supra note 79, at 933. 
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Nelson as well as Milgrom and Roberts is extended from nondurable 
goods—or more precisely, from goods that generate repeat purchases—
to durable goods, which are goods that do not generate repeat 
purchases.92  The signalling argument, however, relies on a different 
explanation.93 
Broadly speaking, advertising has been shown to be neither 
necessary to signal quality nor cheaper than alternative signals such as 
high prices.  Signalling explanations of advertising, therefore, appear 
weaker than originally argued by the proponents94 who sought to reply 
to criticisms against the social waste associated with advertising. 
There have also been some empirical analyses of the signalling 
hypothesis, but the results of these studies are rather inconclusive.95  The 
findings provide, at best, weak support for the signalling hypothesis:  
some positive and significant correlations among quality, advertising, 
and price exist in a cross section of products or models of a product 
within an industry.96  In many instances, there seems to be no correlation 
at all among these variables, not even a negative correlation.  As Kyle 
Bagwell sums up, the “main empirical implication is that no systematic 
correlation between advertising and quality is to be expected, since the 
relationship reflects market circumstances and the simultaneous use of 
price and advertising as signals of quality.”97 
In conclusion, the quality-signalling argument cannot be invoked to 
extend the protection of “strong” trademarks:  the claim cannot be 
made that goods and services that are linked to famous brands created 
 
 92. Id. at 932–33; see Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 44, at 796; Nelson, supra note 44, 
at 729. 
 93. Linnemer, supra note 79, at 933. 
 94. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 44, at 751. 
 95. See, e.g., Robert B. Archibald et al., Quality, Price, Advertising, and Published 
Quality Ratings, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 347, 350–51 (1983); Richard E. Caves & David P. 
Greene, Brands’ Quality Levels, Prices, and Advertising Outlays:  Empirical Evidence on 
Signals and Information Costs, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 29, 44–49 (1996); Ignatius Horstmann 
& Glenn MacDonald, Is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?  Evidence from the Compact 
Disc Player Market, 1983–1992, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 317, 326–30 (2003); Nichols, supra 
note 68, at 928–35; Louis Thomas et al., An Empirical Examination of Advertising as a Signal 
of Product Quality, 37 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 415, 421–24 (1998); see also Sridhar Moorthy 
& Hao Zhao, Advertising and Quality:  An Empirical Analysis (Simon Sch., Univ. of 
Rochester, Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. MS 95-04, 1996). 
 96. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 97. Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising 104 (Columbia Univ., Dep’t of 
Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 0506-01, 2005), available at http://www.columbia. 
edu/cu/economics/discpapr/DP0506-01.pdf. 
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by means of large advertising outlays are systematically characterized by 
high quality. 
V.  BRAND EXTENSIONS AND PRODUCT QUALITY 
The relationship between trademark protection and product quality 
can also be analyzed by taking into account the economic literature on 
extensions.  Brand extension is a phenomenon that consists of extending 
an established brand name, which is identified with a product in one 
market, to a new product in another market—this is also known as 
brand stretching.98  Well-known examples of brand extensions include 
the following:  (1) the VIRGIN mark,99 which has been extended to 
beverages, music products, air and railway services, and financial 
products,100 and (2) the BIC mark,101 which is applied to pens, lighters, 
shavers, kayaks, and windsurfs.102  It goes without saying that, like 
advertising, brand extensions presuppose trademark protection:  when a 
firm wants to extend a brand into a new market, it is expected to 
register the corresponding trademark in the related product class(es).  
Brand extension is often a means to save advertising costs, and the two 
practices may be considered as substitutes.103  In addition, brand 
extensions are adopted by those firms that possess “strong” trademarks 
thanks to high marketing and advertising expenditures.  For these 
reasons, the issues concerning trademark protection, product quality, 
advertising expenditures, and branding strategies are interrelated. 
The issue of brand extensions leads to the central topic of this 
Article:  the rationale for extended protection of “strong” trademarks.  
Brand extension is primarily implemented by granting protection to a 
trademark even in those comparatively remote product classes where 
the “strong” mark is not registered; to the extent that consumers may 
establish a link with the senior trademark, there is a defense for the 
“potential” brand extension of the same. 
Some authors have investigated the rationale behind a brand 
extension strategy.  Luís M.B. Cabral, Jay Pil Choi, and Birger 
 
 98. Lynne M. Pepall & Daniel J. Richards, The Simple Economics of Brand Stretching, 
75 J. BUS. 535, 535 (2002). 
 99. Virgin Products, http://www.virgin.com/Products.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 100. Id. 
 101. BIC Corporate:  Our Brands, http://www.bicworld.com/inter_en/corporate/brands/ 
brand_bic.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Daniel C. Smith & C. Whan Park, The Effects of Brand Extensions on Market 
Share and Advertising Efficiency, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 296, 297 (1992). 
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Wernerfelt stress that extensions are primarily linked to a firm’s attempt 
to build or maintain a certain reputation for quality of a product.104  Choi 
demonstrates that brand extension helps a multiproduct monopolist to 
introduce a new experience good with less price distortion.105  Cabral 
shows that for a given level of past performance, which gives rise to a 
certain reputation, firms stretch their brands if, and only if, product 
quality is sufficiently high.106 
With a slightly different approach, Lynne M. Pepall and Daniel J. 
Richards study the relationship between brand extension and market 
structure.107  For these authors, neither scope economies nor brand 
identity as signals of quality fit particularly well with explanations of the 
various types of brand stretching evidenced by real markets.108  By using 
the concepts of brand recognition, Pepall and Richards show that it is 
possible to comprehend the purpose of particularly “strange” 
extensions—that is, those taking place between markets that are 
completely distinct in terms of both technology and market demand.109 
In general, these models highlight that brand extensions may be used 
to signal high product quality, but other variables are at work as well.  
Consider, for instance, private labels, which are the most common form 
of brand extension.  The quality positioning of private labels perceived 
by consumers is often lower with respect to branded goods.  Hence, a 
private label may signal a particular level of quality, but not necessarily 
a high quality.  The quality signalling through a brand extension seems 
to depend on the nature of goods, as in the case of advertising.  In fact, 
most theoretical models of brand extension deal with experience goods, 
and the results only relate to these kinds of goods.  We could add that in 
order for a signal of quality to be effective, brand extensions should 
assume repeat purchases.  Hence, a direct and positive correlation 
between brand extension and product quality is not an outcome that 
may be generalized.  In conclusion, legal institutions cannot rely on this 
correlation to justify a particularly high protection of “strong” brands 
 
 104. Luís M.B. Cabral, Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 658 
(2000); Jay Pil Choi, Brand Extension as Informational Leverage, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 655 
(1998); Birger Wernerfelt, Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality:  An 
Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond, 19 RAND J. ECON. 458 (1988). 
 105. Choi, supra note 104, at 661–664. 
 106. Cabral, supra note 104, at 664. 
 107. Pepall & Richards, supra note 98, at 535. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. at 536. 
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and trademarks that might be extended by forbidding unauthorized 
brand extensions by firms that want to free ride on a famous brand. 
VI.  FREE RIDING AND TRADEMARK DILUTION 
The partial results that we have obtained so far do not take into 
account the negative spillover effects that may derive from a free riding 
strategy on a famous trademark.  In reality, the defense of the extended 
protection of “strong” trademarks may be to a great extent based on the 
likelihood that free riding practices dilute the promotional value of a 
trademark. 
Trademark dilution is an elusive concept.  Trademark dilution laws 
existed in twenty-five states before the passage of the federal statute,110 
but courts were often hesitant to use them because dilution was 
perceived to be a somewhat nebulous concept and particularly difficult 
to prove.111  The 2006 amendments enacted by the TDRA struck the 
prior definition of “dilution” from the federal statute,112 but the FTDA, 
as it was then codified at section 45 of the Lanham Act, had defined 
dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify 
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence 
of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other 
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.”113  It is 
clear, though, that this definition did not establish a precise method to 
ascertain and measure trademark dilution.114  In fact, many authors 
continue to provide different interpretations of the concept, especially 
when it is to be applied to real cases.115 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that free riding is likely to 
cause dilution and that this, in turn, determines a reduction of the ability 
of a trademark to generate revenues in all the markets where the brand 
is associated with a product or service.  This permits an analysis of the 
welfare effects caused by free riding.  Here, a graphical example is used 
 
 110. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995). 
 111. Id. at 3–4 (noting that “court decisions have been inconsistent and some courts are 
reluctant to grant nationwide injuctions for violation of state law where half of the states have 
no dilution law”). 
 112. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 113. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000)). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 
729 (2000). 
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to examine these effects, but the Appendix provides more general proof 
of the results.116 
Suppose that firm A has built a “strong” and famous brand, thanks 
to high advertising expenditures and quality products.  Let us call it 
brand T.  Firm A has the opportunity to use T in distinct markets.117  
Firm A will use T until the marginal revenue of a brand extension is 
higher than its marginal cost.  This situation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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On the x-axis we have the product classes (n) where T can be 
extended; these are ordered according to the ability of the extension to 
generate revenues.  The profitability of extensions is assumed to be 
invariant with respect to the identity of the user of trademark T.  On the 
y-axis there are the costs and revenues of firms.  For the sake of 
simplicity, all variables are assumed to be continuous. 
The function R0 is the marginal revenue of the brand extension in 
the product class n. Here, we assume that R0 mainly depends on the 
advertising and marketing outlays aimed at promoting a good quality 
product.  The profitability of an extension is naturally affected by the 
structure and the nature of competition in each market.  However, this 
is not essential to obtain our qualitative results. 
In Figure 1, c0 is the marginal cost of extension for firm A, which we 
assume to be constant.  This is because firm A offers goods with a high 
and constant quality in order to maintain a reputation for having a 
“strong” brand.  In addition, from a promotional point of view, brand 
extension only implies that a certain product is related to T in a 
 
 116. See infra Appendix. 
 117. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the product classes where trademarks are 
registered correspond to real markets. 
      R1
       R0
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particular market, and this does not make the marginal cost increase 
with the number of extensions. 
Hence, firm A will extend T in n0 product classes.  Now suppose that 
there are other firms interested in using T.  Moreover, suppose that 
these firms offer low quality products and that they do not incur 
advertising costs in order to keep trademark reputations high (these 
costs are incurred by the senior user A).  These firms will then have 
lower costs (c1) if they use T, and they will be attracted by the revenues 
described by R0.  In particular, they will find it profitable to use T until 
n1. 
An extended protection of trademark T can be justified as follows.  
If it were possible to use T in those product classes to the right of n0—
that is, if trademark protection were applied only to product classes 
where A actually offers goods and services, other firms would start to 
use T.  This would make R0 shift to R1:  the use of T would be, in general, 
less profitable because, for instance, inappropriate associations would 
dilute the trademark value.118  Note that, as indicated earlier, we do not 
assume consumer confusion as to the origin of goods, but even without 
confusion, bad associations are likely to generate trademark dilution. 
As a result, T will be used in only n3 product classes (firm A will use 
it in n2 and other firms in n3-n2 product classes), and the total number of 
classes covered by T will decrease (n3<n0).  Moreover, the erosion of 
trademark value will reduce total profits.119  In other words, both 
producers and consumers will be worse off by a limited protection of T.  
Here, we do not analyze the effects of trademark extension in terms of 
price and quantity.  However, we assume that, in each market, fewer 
products decrease consumer welfare, given consumers’ love of 
(perceived) variety.  To avoid this outcome, the protection of T should 
 
 118. Another cause of trademark dilution is the market failure of a brand extension.  
Unsuccessful products, for example, may produce negative spillover effects on other goods 
with the same trademark.  Gregg Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of Product Recalls on 
the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 512, 514–15, 533 (1985); Mark L. Mitchell, The Impact 
of External Parties on Brand-Name Capital:  The 1982 Tylenol Poisonings and Subsequent 
Cases, in RISK, MEDIA AND STIGMA:  UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 203, 204, 211–12 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001); Mary Sullivan, 
Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded Products, 63 J. BUS. 309, 327–29 (1990).  
Some authors affirm that “[t]rademark dilution shares some similarities with brand name 
dilution but differs from it as well.”  Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution:  
Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 266 (2000).  
In our theoretical framework, we assume that they define the same phenomenon. 
 119. Note that the decrease in A’s profit (represented in the solid area) is greater than 
the other firms’ additional profits (represented by the striped area). 
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be extended beyond n0—that is, over product classes where A does not 
currently offer any goods or services. 
One could argue that those firms that use T do not necessarily offer 
low quality goods.  There might be firms producing good quality 
products, but despite this, such firms would not incur high advertising 
costs while, in contrast, firm A does.  There would still be room for the 
use of a “strong” trademark with no spillover effect.  However, lower 
quality firms have a greater incentive to use T because the expected 
profits are higher.  Therefore, if trademark protection were limited to n0, 
low quality firms would probably be the first to exploit the opportunity 
of using a “strong” brand. 
Naturally, welfare changes depend on the magnitude of each effect.  
In Figure 2,120 the use of T by other firms (in n3-n2 product classes) leads 
to an increase of both total classes where T is used (n3>n0) and aggregate 
profits.  Note, however, that in order to obtain such an outcome we 
need to assume a great cost differential between the senior user A and 
other firms (c0-c1, due, for example, to high quality differentiation) and a 
low spillover effect (R0-R1).  Since a large cost differentiation is 
theoretically and empirically associated with strong spillover effects, the 
situation described in Figure 2 seems unlikely. 
In addition, suppose that Figure 2 describes the real marginal cost 
and revenue functions faced by the senior user and the free riders—that 
is, assume a great cost differential and a modest dilution effect.  In this 
situation, the senior user would find it profitable to free ride on his or 
her own trademark in order to increase profits.  For example, if the 
senior user decided to cut the advertising investments and incur the 
marginal cost (c1), the marginal revenue would shift from R0 to R1, and 
he or she would use T in n3 product classes.  In the new equilibrium, the 
total profits of the senior user would increase.  If the senior user is a 
rational agent, when he or she does not extend his or her trademark 
until n3, then Figure 2 does not adequately represent reality.  Therefore, 
it is highly unlikely that free riding on a famous trademark increases 
profits in product classes where the trademark is used.  This argument 
will be formalized and generalized in the Appendix.121 
In summary, the use of a famous brand in those markets where it is 
not legally protected may cause a large trademark dilution, and this may 
reduce the profitability of the trademark to all potential users—that is, 
both the senior user and the free riders.  The overall effect is the 
 
 120. Note that symbols have the same meaning in Figure 2 as those defined in Figure 1. 
 121. See infra Appendix. 
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reduction of social welfare in terms of product variety and aggregate 
profits.  In addition, when trademark dilution is negligible, it is unlikely 
that free riding implies an increase of the markets where the famous 
trademark is used. 
 
Figure 2 
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CONCLUSION 
Statutory evolution and recent cases show that the protection 
afforded to “strong” trademarks is increasing.122  Even in the absence of 
any likelihood of confusion as to the origin of products, the protection 
of a trademark aimed at providing its owner with a return for 
promotional and advertising investment is clear. 
The broad development in the law governing the protection of 
“strong” trademarks calls for a reformulation of conventional economic 
analysis.  Because it is widely believed that the rationale for intellectual 
property protection should not consist in the remuneration of private 
investment as such, one should look for an efficiency rationale or for 
explanations based on other criteria to justify such an evolution in 
trademark protection. 
A “strong” and famous brand may give unrelated firms incentives to 
choose a free riding strategy to exploit the full potential of the brand:  a 
small producer of skis might, for example, be interested in using the 
FERRARI brand for the launch of a new product line.  Free riding may, 
in turn, generate negative spillover effects and reduce the average 
quality in the market because famous trademarks are usually associated 
with high quality products.  What is the economic logic behind this 
argument? 
We have shown that the existence of trademark protection does not 
create an incentive to continuous improvement in product quality, but 
 
 122. See supra Part II. 
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rather to maintain the quality of offered goods and services.  We have 
also conjectured that an extended protection of “strong” trademarks, 
which derive their strength from high promotional expenses, may be 
explained by using a quality-signalling argument:  the more a firm 
invests in promotion, the higher the quality of its products and, thus, the 
higher the protection afforded to its trademarks should be in order to 
maintain the incentive to invest in high quality.  Unfortunately, both the 
theoretical and empirical studies about the relationship between 
advertising promotion outlays and product quality are far from 
conclusive.123  Also, brand extension strategies do not present a clear 
link to quality products.124  Therefore, the extended protection of 
“strong” trademarks that might be stretched cannot be primarily based 
on quality arguments; the economic logic of the extended protection 
needs a different theoretical background. 
Looking for an alternative explanation, we have analyzed the 
relationship between free riding behavior, trademark dilution, and 
welfare changes.  Under certain conditions, we have shown that an 
extended protection of “strong” trademarks may find a more 
satisfactory theoretical explanation.  When a brand is particularly 
valuable, some firms could use it in markets where the senior user does 
not operate—where, according to early trademark law, the 
corresponding trademark would not be protected.  Given the lower 
costs incurred by those firms, the use of the trademark may earn them 
positive profits.  However, the higher the profitability of the trademark 
and the higher the cost differentials due, for example, to quality 
differentials, the higher the negative spillover effects will probably be—
in other words, trademark dilution.  Since spillover effects impact the 
senior user and also the profitability of the trademark in all markets, the 
absence of an extended protection of “strong” trademarks may lead to a 
reduction in welfare, although measuring the latter is particularly 
difficult in this context because it should be estimated in a number of 
separate markets.  In conclusion, when spillover effects are possible, it 
seems to be rational to protect a “strong” and famous trademark even in 
those markets where it is not actually used or registered; this tacitly 
guarantees any potential, future brand extensions by the senior user. 
 
 123. See, e.g., Kihlstrom & Riordan, supra note 44; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 44; 
Nelson, supra note 44. 
 124. See, e.g., Cabral, supra note 104; Choi, supra note 104; Smith & Park, supra note 
103; Wernerfelt, supra note 104. 
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This result is far from conclusive because the magnitude of welfare 
effects may change from market to market.  An empirical analysis of 
trademark dilution, which identifies the markets where the likelihood of 
dilution is higher, could help the research on these themes and provide 
empirical support for the application of trademark law.  At the moment, 
the analysis that we have put forth may be helpful in clarifying the logic 
that underpins current trends in trademark protection. 
APPENDIX 
Assume that the marginal revenue of the trademark is given by f(n), 
where n represents the product classes where the trademark may be 
used.  In addition, assume that f(n) is continuous and decreasing.  The 
spillover effects of a free riding strategy make f(n) shift downward to 
g(n)=f(n)-α, with α>0.  The marginal cost is constant, and it is given by 
k>0 for the senior user and c>0 for the free riders, with k>c.  Denote n0:  
f(n0)=k and n1:  g(n1)=c.  We want to show that when free riding leads to 
an increase in the product classes covered by the famous trademark,125 
then the senior user would have the incentive to free ride on his or her 
trademark.  That is, we want to show that 
    
n1            n0    
                               ∫ g(n)dn – cn1  >  ∫ f(n)dn – kn0                                             (1) 
        0          0  
when 
n1 > n0.                                                                                                              (2) 
First, note that when 
    
n0            n0    
                             ∫ [f(n) – α]dn – cn0  >  ∫ f(n)dn – kn0                                     (3) 
        0          0  
we have, by integrating, rearranging, and considering that g(n)=f(n)–α, 
that 
α < k – c.                                                (4) 
 
When condition (4) is verified, we have n1>n0.  In fact, f(n0)=k, and 
g(n1)=f(n1)–α=c.  Therefore, with α<k–c or k>c+α, f(n0)>f(n1).  Since 
f(n) is decreasing, we have that n1>n0.  This means that when the 
trademark dilution (α) is lower than the cost differential (k–c), the total 
 
 125. See supra Figure 2. 
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number of classes covered by the famous trademark are higher when a 
free riding strategy is allowed. 
 
When n1>n0, we have 
    
n1            n0    
                               ∫ g(n)dn – cn1  >  ∫ g(n)dn – cn0                                            (5) 
        0          0  
or 
    
n1   
∫ g(n)dn > c(n1 – n0)                          (6) 
        n0    
because g(n)>c for all n∈(n0, n1), and g(n1)=c. 
 
Therefore, when n1>n0, conditions (5) and (3) are verified and, by 
transitivity, we have 
    
n1            n0    
                               ∫ g(n)dn – cn1  >  ∫ f(n)dn – kn0.                                        
        0          0  
 
